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Abstract—Software Defined Networking (SDN) is an evolving
network paradigm which promises greater interoperability, more
innovation, flexible and effective solutions. Although SDN on the
surface provides a simple framework for network programmabil-
ity and monitoring, few has been said about security measures to
make it resilient to hitherto security flaws in traditional network
and the new threats the architecture is ushering in. One of
the security weaknesses the architecture is ushering in due to
separation of control and data plane is Denial of Service (DoS)
attack. The main goal of this attack is to make network resources
unavailable to legitimate users or introduce large delays. In this
paper, the effect of DoS attack on SDN is presented using Mininet,
OpenDaylight (ODL) controller and network performance testing
tools such as iperf and ping. Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMP) flood attack is performed on a Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) server and a User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
server which are both connected to OpenFlow switches. The
simulation results reveal a drop in network throughput from
233Mbps to 87.4Mbps and the introduction of large jitter between
0.003ms and 0.789ms during DoS attack.
Index Terms—Software Defined Networks, DoS, Network Se-
curity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer networks have become part of our everyday lives
from government to commercial enterprises to individuals.
[1]. These networks are built from large number of devices
such as routers, switches and middle boxes with complex
protocols running on them. Network administrators are saddled
with the responsibility of configuring these devices that are
vendor specific and configuration policies are implemented on
each devices. As a result, network management and dynamic
response to events and applications is arduous and prone to
error.
In addition to configuration complexity, operators have little
options or mechanisms to respond to difficulties and enforce
the required policies in dynamic environments [2]. Similarly,
in the face of growing traffic and demand for more data rate
from consumers, the service providers must keep up with the
pace by investing in bigger and faster links and edge routers,
even though revenues are growing quite slowly [3].
In view of the challenges network operators are facing, the
need for a programmable network which is cost effective and
robust enough to meet the demand of users is imperative.
Thus, the emergence of Software Defined Networking (SDN).
SDN has created great hope to overcome age-old problems
in networking while simultaneously enabling the introduction
of complex, secure and reliable network policies for next
generation networks [4]. The revolutionary concept of SDN
has brought change to existing networks by separating the
forwarding functionalities of existing devices, known as data
plane from control element, known as control plane [5].
The future of SDN lies solely in its acceptance and deploy-
ment. Technology and its deployment take years before it can
be available to end users due to standardisation process and
Request for Comments (RFCs). Speculatins however remain
as to whether same should be expected for SDN or not.
According to [1] a proposal for open and programmable
network is presented. The author further emphasize the need
for researchers to run experiment on campus network using an
OpenFlow switch. In line with this, ETHANE, a new network
architecture for enterprise was suggested [6]. In their proposed
architecture, ETHANE switch doesnt need to learn addresses,
support Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs) or check for
source-address spoofing and it has been deployed in a campus
environment. The proposal was taken to another level when a
major player in the networking industry, Google, deployed B4
using OpenFlow switches in their Wide Area Networks (WAN)
data centre [7]. Also, with the advent of a Linux foundation
collaborative project, OpenDaylight (ODL) [8] platform and
VMware NSX virtualisation platform [13], global acceptance
and deployment is not far from reach.
In spite of the programmability, flexibility, universal connec-
tivity and decentralised control, which were critical to SDN
success, they are at odds with making it more secure. The
SDN platform can bring with it several security breaches
which include an increased potential for Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks due to controller centralisation and flow table
limitations in network devices [9]. Furthermore, abstraction
of flows and underlying hardware resources make it easier
for harvesting of intelligence which can be used effortlessly
for further exploitation and reprogramming entire network by
malicious user [4].
In this paper, the impact of DoS attack on SDN is presented.
The simulation has been perfomed using mininet and Open-
  Fig. 1. SDN architecture illustrating the data, control and application layers.
Daylight controller tools and the simulation result shows that
DoS flooding attack on SDN network can degrade network
performance by decreasing network throughput and introduce
large jitter. This paper is structured as follows: Section II
presents related works on the SDN architecture, vulnerabilities
in the SDN architecture and DoS attacks on SDN. The
experimental method and tools are presented in Section III.
Then Section IV shows the experimental set-up. The results
and analysis are presented in Section V. Finally, the conclusion
and future work are presented in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
A. SDN Architecture
SDN architecture encompasses the complete network plat-
form. It is a modular approach that defines chain of com-
mand and interoperability within network. Unlike traditional
network, the intelligence of data plane devices is removed to
a logically centralised control system [10]. Fig. 1 presents the
SDN architecture showing the data/infrastructure, control and
application layer. In an SDN architecture, there are two main
elements: the controllers and the forwarding devices. A for-
warding device is a hardware or software element specialised
in packet forwarding and based on a pipeline of flow tables
where each entry of a flow table has: a matching rule, action
to be executed on matching packets and counters that keep
statistics of matching packets [4]. The controller serves as the
brain of the network and it deals with management of network
state. Below is a description of various layers:
Infrastructure layer: This layer is also known as data
plane. It consists of simple forwarding elements without
embedded control or software to take autonomous decisions.
It is accessible through the southbound interface and allows
packet switching and forwarding.
Control layer: This layer consists of SDN controllers
providing a consolidated control functionalities through Ap-
plication Programming Interfaces (APIs). The crucial value of
the controller is to provide abstractions, essential services, and
common APIs to developers. Three communication interfaces
allows the controller to interact: northbound, southbound and
the east/westbound interfaces.
i) Southbound Interfaces: Southbound interface allows the
controller and forwarding elements to interact in the
infrastructure layer, thus being the crucial instrument for
clearly separating the control and data plane functionality.
ii) Northbound Interfaces: This interface is the connecting
bridge between application layer and control layer. It
enables the programmability of the controllers by expos-
ing the data models and other functionalities within the
controllers for use by applications at the application layer.
The northbound interface is mostly a software ecosystem,
hence, a common northbound interface is still an open
issue.
iii) East/Westbound Interfaces: This interface is a special
communication interface envisioned for distributed con-
trollers to synchronise state for high availability. Its func-
tion include import/export data between controllers and
monitoring/notification capabilities to check if a controller
is up or notify a takeover on a set of forwarding elements.
Application Layer: The application layer consists of end-
user business applications and network services. Example of
application that runs here is network virtualisation. Network
policy is also defined here.
B. Vulnerabilities in SDN Architecture
A number of security analyses has been carried on the
vulnerabilities in SDN. Adnan et al. in [5] identified the state
of art in SDN security solutions with respect to each layer
of SDN architecture. The work focuses on possible security
attacks in SDN which could be executed. However, no solution
to identified threats is presented. A comprehensive survey of
security in SDN is presented in [11][12], the authors identified
vulnerabilities introduced by separation of control and data
plane. Sandra et al. in [11] presents an overview of SDN
security and itemise research work coupled with solution to
security issues in SDN. In [12] classification is done using
the STRIDE approach and possible SDN security controls is
proposed. The concept of offering SDN security as a service
is presented in [13].
Kreutz et al. in [2] presents a high level security analysis.
Seven main potential threat vectors are presented. Three of the
seven identified threat vectors are specific to SDN and relates
to the three planes present in SDN architecture. The analysis
does not present SDN as a less secure network but triggers
the need for innovative ways of responding to the new threats
arising from network programmability. The authors state the
consequences of these threats in SDN and solutions to the
seven threat vectors was proposed.
In [14], a feasibility study on attacking SDN network is
carried out by fingerprinting to know whether the network uses
SDN/OpenFlow switches. The SDN network is then subjected
to a specifically crafted flow requests from the data plane to
the control plane to exhaust the network resources. Another
security vulnerabilities was analysed in ProtoGENI [15]. The
authors explored three potential security issues as follows:
i) Resource connection: Once a malicious user obtains
access to one experiment node, attacks can easily be
launched by utilising the huge ProtoGENI computing
resources as a launchpad to harm existing internet users.
ii) Wireless Nodes Distribution: Network sniffing or spoof-
ing can be done here to identify desired node for launch-
ing attacks.
iii) Virtualization Technology: In ProtoGENI virtualisation,
ProtoGENI resources are shared among as many user as
possible. Any bug or compromise from a single device
will expose other users in sharing resources to attacks.
The Authors discovered the possibility of using ProtoGENI
resources to launch flooding attack to the wider internet. Also,
the possibility of compromising confidentiality and availability
of other ProtoGENI users is high.
C. DoS Attack on SDN
DoS and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack remains one of the
severe network security problems in both traditional network
and SDN. Due to separation of control and data plane, an
attacker could saturate the controller with malformed packets
requiring a flow rule decision. On the other hand, the flow
table of the infrastructure device can be overwhelmed with ma-
licious packets. To address bottlenecks of potential saturation
attack, AVANT-GUARD [16] introduce connection migration
to reduce amount of data-to-control-plane interactions. The
method enables the data plane to shield the control plane
from saturation attacks. However, the data plane itself is
subject to attack. Similarly, a backup strategy which offers
resilience against failures in a centralised controlled network
is presented in [17]. This approach is an attempt to solve
single point of failure bottleneck and it provides seamless
transition between primary controller to a back-up controller.
However, this solution is limited to centralised implementation
and it also raises concern in terms of trust between the east-
west interface communications. In addition, Braga et al. [18]
proposed lightweight, a new method for detecting DDoS. The
proposed method boasts of high rate of true positives and low
rate of false alarm using Self Organising Maps (SOM) for flow
analysis. The lightweight method consider median values in
training the SOM. However, the method reports false negatives
when the attack rate parameter is set to a low value.
The controller has been compared to an operating system
capable of managing applications through programmatic inter-
face [19]. Similarly, ETHANE was built to provide network-
wide fine-grain policy using a centralised declaration and
enforcing it [6]. While the concept of a centralised controller
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Fig. 2. Methodology flowchart.
allow the simplification of policy enforcement and manage-
ment tasks for network managers, it creates quite a number
of bottle necks. In [9], analysis of SDN implementation key
challenges has been carried out. The authors opined deploy-
ment of SDN technology will contribute to the vision of future
communications if outstanding challenges were resolved. In
[20] the possibility of DoS attacks and poor rule design
that can lead to saturating volumes of controller queries is
discussed. The author highlights the OpenFlow vulnerabilities
in terms of lack of adoption of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
for controller-switch communication. Although a number of
vulnerabilities is proposed, none is proven in the work.
III. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD AND TOOLS
In this experiments , Mininet is used [21]. Mininet is an
open source network emulator devoted entirely to OpenFlow
architecture and SDN. For the controller, ODL controller
is used [22]. ODL integrates open source, open standards
and open APIs to deliver SDN platform to make networks
more programmable and adaptive.DoS attacks usually engage
numerous compromised hosts and a rich topology to launch a
successful attack on its victim. While our scenario is much
simpler than what is obtainable in real world attacks, we
deliberately chose such a low-complexity set-up to expose
and analyse the impact of DoS attack on SDN. Common
testing tools such as, ping and iperf are used to generate
traffic between host and servers. Fig. 2 shows the methodology
flowchart with each step explained below:
Step 1: Start Mininet and ODL controller
Sudo mn --custom scenario.py --topo
--controller = remote,ip = x.x.x.x
Fig. 3. Expermental setup.
Where x.x.x.x represents the ip address of the remote con-
troller.
Check connectivity using
$mininet > net
Step 2: Create UDP and TCP server
UDP: iperf -s -u -p 5566 -i1
TCP: iperf -s -p 5566 -i1
The TCP server is made to listen on port 5566 with a default
window size of 85.3Kilobytes. Similarly, UDP server is made
to listen on port 5566 with a default UDP buffer size of
208Kilobytes while receiving 1470 bytes datagrams and the
result is monitored every 1 seconds.
Step 3: Hosts make requests from TCP server and UDP
server
TCP: -iperf -c x.x.x.x -p5566 -t100
UDP: -iperf -c x.x.x.x -u -t100 -p5566
Step 4 and Step 5: Results were extracted using AWK
file and results plotted using MATLAB. Then, malicious hosts
5 and 6 launched flooding attack on the servers (similar to
step 3). Legitimate traffic is started at the beginning of an
experiment, and an attack is launched shortly after for a
duration of 100 seconds.
Step 6: End
mininet# ctrl z (end mininet)
Sudo mn -c (clear topology)
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP
In this section, a series of experiments are performed to
verify the effects of DoS attack in the SDN network. The
experimental setup is shown in Fig. 3. There are two servers
and four switches in the network. Each switch has a host
connected to it. The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
server is connected to OpenFlow switch1 while User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) server is connected to OpenFlow switch3.
 
 Fig. 4. TCP requests from host 4 to server 1 under ICMP attack.
 
 Fig. 3. TCP requests from host 4 to server 1 under ICMP attack.
 
 
Fig. 4. TCP requests from host 2 to server 1 under ICMP attack.
the average throughput of host2 requests from TCP server1
is 233Mbits/sec for a total of 2.72GBytes of information
transferred. Notice that Host 2 shows a better bandwidth
utilisation than Host 4 and the reason for this is not far-
fetched; they are both connected to OpenFlow switch 1. While
the better bandwidth utilisation is seen as an advantage here,
it is a major security risk and attractive honeypot to launch
attack against the server. The impact of this connection is felt
when the server is subjected to ICMP flood attack. During
attack, the average throughput dropped to 106Mbits/sec from
214Mbits/sec recorded for H4 requests from server1 without
ICMP flood attack. The impact of the attack launched by host
5 and 6 became noticeable after 15secs of transmission and the
bandwidth utilisation degraded for the rest of the transmission.
The trend is similar for host2 requests from TCP server 1 as
 
 
 
Fig. 5. TCP requests from host 4 to server 1 under ICMP attack.
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Fig 512. TCP requests from host 4 to server 1 under ICMP attack.
degradation started after 8secs of transmission and degraded
for the rest of the transmission. The average throughput for
h2 requests from TCP server1 dropped from 233Mbits/sec to
87.4Mbits/sec when the server is under attack. The degradation
is more severe for host 2 when under attack even though
higher throughput is recorded during normal operation. Hence,
the need for better network design, traffic isolation based on
priority for mission critical network and dynamic proactive
ways of addressing DoS attacks when the system is under
serious attack.
B. Effect of Dos attack on Jitter
In Fig. 5 and 6, using UDP buffer size of 208 Kbyte, the jit-
ter varies between 0.003ms and 0.789ms. Host 4 Jitter remains
within a fair range because it is connected to OpenFlow switch
Fig. 5. TCP requests from host 2 to server 1 under ICMP attack.
ICMP flood attack will be launched against both servers by
malicious hosts 5 and 6.
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
As discussed in the experimental setup, we simulate for
two different scenarios; TCP and UDP requests under normal
operating condition and under attack. The results for these
scenarios are discussed below.
A. Effect of DoS attack on throughput
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 shows a significant drop in throughput due
to malicious behaviour (ICMP flood attack) being executed
by two attacking nodes. The average throughput for requests
made from host 4 to th TCP server1 is 214Mbits/Sec for a
total of 2.5Gbytes of information transferred in 100 seconds.
  
 
Fig. 6. UDP requests from host 4 to server 1 under ICMP attack.
Similarly, the average throughput of host2 requests from TCP
server1 is 233Mbits/sec for a total of 2.72GBytes of informa-
tion transferred. Notice that Host 2 shows a better bandwidth
utilisation than Host 4 and the reason for this is not far-
fetched; they are both connected to OpenFlow switch 1. While
the better bandwidth utilisation is seen as an advantage here,
it is a major security risk and attractive honeypot to launch
attack against the server. The impact of this connection is felt
when the server is subjected to ICMP flood attack. During
attack, the average throughput dropped to 106Mbits/sec from
214Mbits/sec recorded for H4 requests from server1 without
ICMP flood attack. The impact of the attack launched by host
5 and 6 became noticeable after 15secs of transmission and the
bandwidth utilisation degraded for the rest of the transmission.
The trend is similar for host2 requests from TCP server 1 as
degradation started after 8secs of transmission and degraded
for the rest of the transmission. The average throughput for
h2 requests from TCP server1 dropped from 233Mbits/sec to
87.4Mbits/sec when the server is under attack. The degradation
is more severe for host 2 when under attack even though
higher throughput is recorded during normal operation. Hence,
the need for better network design, traffic isolation based on
priority for mission-critical network and dynamic proactive
ways of addressing DoS attacks when the system is under
serious attack.
B. Effect of Dos attack on Jitter
Jitter is defined as a variation in the delay of received
packets. In Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, using UDP buffer size of 208
Kbytes, the jitter varies between 0.003ms and 0.789ms. Host
4 Jitter remains within a fair range because it is connected
to OpenFlow switch 3 with the UDP server. The spiky delay
waveform indicates the presence of congestion in the network.
Even though the congestion occurs for a very short period,
if the congestion time is more than the scheduled packet
 
 
 
Fig. 7. UDP requests from host 4 to server 1 under ICMP attack.
transmission time, it will lead to packet drops. Notice that
jitter values obtained from host 4 requests to UDP server is
better compared to requests from host 2.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, the impact of DoS attack on SDN has been
demonstrated. This study reveals that for a simple network, a
DoS attack on the infrastructure plane (UDP and TCP servers)
will highly degrade network performance as shown in the
performance metrics (throughput and jitter). For a Distributed
DoS (DDoS) attack with more active agents, the attack will
be more severe. Hence, the need for a robust resilient SDN
security architecture. While the evaluation of the impact of
DoS attack on SDNs remains a very rigorous endeavour, the
work carried out in this paper offers a primer to the objective
evaluation of DoS attack on SDNs. The simulation results
revealed a drop in network throughput from 233Mbps to
87.4Mbps and the introduction of large jitter between 0.003ms
and 0.789ms during DoS attack. In the future, the mitigation
of DoS and DDoS attacks in an exhaustive way at both control
and data plane layers will be examined.
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